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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE(S) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988) is the 
determinative statute in this case. 20 C.F.R. 404,430 (1983) and 
Social Security Administration, Ruling No. 84-25 (1984) are the 
applicable Rules. These references are each set forth in full in 
the Addendum hereto as Exhibits A, B and C, respectively. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
A Social Security Administration decision that an individual 
is "totally disabled" is not dispositive of the question of whether 
he is "permanently and totally disabled" pursuant to Utah Workers 
Compensation law. Under Social Security regulations, rules and 
practice, an individual may be classified as being "totally 
disabled" but such a determination is never final, and is always 
subject to prescribed regulatory, periodic review. 
In addition, the Social Security Administration actually 
encourages individuals who have been determined to be "totally 
disabled" to return to gainful employment, and if they are 
successful in doing so, they will be removed from that status. In 
essence, a Social Security determination of "total disability" is 
contingent and as such may properly and accurately be characterized 
as a temporary as distinguished from a permanent conclusion. 
At the time of his industrial injury in 1989, Mr. Abel, 
although previously determined by the Social Security 
Administration to be "totally disabled", was engaged in 
substantial, gainful employment for Respondent West Jordan Care 
Center. He was, in fact, engaged in a proper and recognized return 
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to work attempt which, unfortunately, proved to be unsuccessful. 
He was unable thereafter to return to work, and all parties 
acknowledge and concede his subsequent unemployability. 
It is significant that pursuant to Utah Workers Compensation 
law, he received temporary, total disability compensation and 
permanent, partial disability compensation, in addition to having 
all of his medical expenses occasioned by his industrial accident 
paid for by the Employer/Carrier. The Industrial Commissions 
final agency action clearly acknowledged Mr. Abel's entitlement to 
all workers compensation benefits provided for by law - except 
those benefits associated with his permanent, total disability 
status. 
Mr. Abel should not be arbitrarily penalized for his good 
faith attempt to return to work, and further should be entitled to 
workers compensation benefits for the incremental loss of wages he 
was earning at the time of his industrial injury. The Industrial 
Commission provided no rationale or reasonable explanation 
whatsoever why it awarded him all workers compensation benefits 
provided for by law with the exception of workers compensation 
benefits for his incremental (and minimal) loss of wages 
occasioned by his accident. 
This case is one of first impression in Utah and clearly tests 
the public policy inherent in encouraging industrially injured 
workers to return to work rather than simply languishing on the 
ledgers of legislative largesse. Reversal of the Industrial 
Commission's myopic and thin-veiled attempt to protect the 
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Employers' Reinsurance Fund - a long-standing indictment of 
Industrial Commission policy - is required here. That most 
unfortunate and inappropriate policy is contrary to the presumption 
of entitlement inherent in Workers Compensation law as remedial 
legislation, as well as public policy which encourages all citizens 
to become and continue to be productive members of society, as 
assets rather than liabilities. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
I 
AN EMPLOYEE INJURED DURING AN UNSUCCESSFUL RETURN TO WORK 
ATTEMPT IS ENTITLED TO WORKERS COMPENSATION BENEFITS, 
INCLUDING PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY COMPENSATION, EVEN 
THOUGH HE WAS RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS WHEN HE 
WAS INJURED. 
A. Petitioner was not "permanently, totally disabled" at 
the time of his industrial injury. 
It is undisputed that in 1984, Mr. Abel was found by the 
Social Security Administration to be disabled. (R. at 145) . 
Notwithstanding Social Security's determination of his disability, 
he reentered the work force and had been working 32 hours a week 
for several weeks prior to his industrial injury. (R. at 32) . The 
fact that he was able to work and perform his duties in an 
acceptable manner uncontrovertedly evidences that he was not 
"permanently and totally disabled" for purposes of Utah's Worker's 
Compensation statutes. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 
208 (Utah 1984). Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P.2d 495 (Utah 1981). 
Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah 1977). 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(5)(b) (1988), provides in 
significant part that a previously determined permanent total 
disability status for compensation purposes ,f. . .ends with the death 
of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work". (Emphasis added). Implicit in the language 
of that statue is that an initial finding of "permanent, total 
disability" is temporary - not permanent, is not conclusive, can 
change and that status ends if and when the employee is capable of 
returning to "regular, steady work." 
Respondents error when they allege - without support in this 
record - that Mr. Abel, at the time of his industrial injury, was 
"incapable of gainful employment." (R. at 63). They ignore both 
the fact that he was working at the time of his work-related 
injury, and that they awarded him workers compensation benefits for 
his injury, thereby acknowledging the fact that he was gainfully 
employed. Both the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission also committed error when they found, as a matter of 
law, that sustained work of 32 hours a week at $3.42/per hour is 
not gainful employment. Significantly, Respondents do not cite any 
evidence in the record or legal authority for this extraordinary 
assertion. 
Respondents attempt to make much of the fact that Mr. Abel 
returned to work, not for economic reasons, but rather "as a way of 
being more useful and active". (R. at 63) . Respondents have cited 
no authority for the proposition that one must be engaged in 
employment sheerly for economic reasons in order to be afforded 
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coverage under the Utah Workers Compensation statutes. Individuals 
work for a variety of reasons and one who earns a wage at a job, 
even if taken primarily in order to be "useful and active", is 
still working and, if injured at work, entitled to workers 
compensation benefits. 
Mr. Abel attacked the Findings of the Administrative Law Judge 
and the Industrial Commission on this point as being inadequate and 
deficient under the requirements laid down in this Court's ruling 
in Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991). Mr. Abel 
in his original Brief assailed the Findings on this issue as mere 
assertions, with no reference to the evidence presented or to 
relevant legal authority. In addition, Mr. Abel also alleged that 
there were no concise findings as to his current medical condition, 
the causes for it or his ability to perform any work in light of 
the industrial injury. 
Respondents on appeal have wholly failed to make any defense 
of the Findings entered at the agency level, apparently conceding 
the accuracy of Mr. Abel's claim of error. The Industrial 
Commission's, as well as the Administrative Law Judge's, purported 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order should, at a 
minimum, be vacated. 
B. Petitioner's Social Security "total disability" status 
does not preclude him from receiving permanent, total disability 
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation statute. 
Under Social Security rules and regulations one can be 
classified for compensation purposes as "totally disabled" and yet 
still be capable of engaging in gainful employment. The applicable 
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Social Security regulations allow one to work and earn up to 
$740.00 per month without jeopardizing one's eligibility to 
continue to receive Social Security disability benefits. See, 
e.g., 20 C.F.R. 404.430 (copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B). 
In addition, if a "totally disabled" individual actually returns to 
work for a continuous period of time equalling nine months at an 
average of 30 hours per week, he may be deemed by the Social 
Security Administration to have returned to substantial, gainful 
employment. His Social Security total disability benefits may then 
be properly terminated. 
In order to encourage those initially found to be "totally 
disabled" to return to work, if possible, the Social Security 
Administration has adopted the "Unsuccessful Work Attempt" (UWA) 
policy contained in Social Security Ruling No. 84-25, (Copy 
attached to Addendum as Exhibit C) . Under that policy, injured 
workers are encouraged to return to work in order to demonstrate 
whether their "disability continues or ceases". Generally 
speaking, a work effort which is for three months or less and is 
interrupted by a new injury, or his prior impairment, is deemed to 
have experienced an "unsuccessful work attempt". Such a worker is 
not penalized by having his benefits interrupted or terminated. 
In addition, the Social Security Administration routinely 
reviews "totally disabled" individuals to discern whether their 
medical conditions have impaired or changed, or their circumstances 
of employability altered, to the point where they are capable of 
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returning to work. If they are, Social Security "total disability" 
benefits may probably be terminated. 
The Social Security disability system clearly stands for the 
proposition that an initial determination of disability is neither 
permanent nor irrebuttable. The Workers' Compensation statutes 
relating to industrial injuries occurring on and after July 1, 1988 
(Applicable to Mr. Abel here) contain a similar philosophy. In 
fact, the 1988 statutory modifications to the "p€>rmanent, total 
disability" statute specifically adopt the federal sequential 
evaluation process, which such process includes a review of a 
previously determined disabled worker7s ability to return to 
substantial, gainful employment, and includes due acknowledgment 
being given for attempted return to work efforts which prove to be 
unsuccessful. This is particularly true where the unsuccessful 
work attempt is directly caused by a significant industrial injury, 
as here, which effectively precludes the completion of an otherwise 
successful return to work effort. 
It is significant that Mr. Abel's work at the West Jordan Care 
Center was proceeding well - until his industrial injury to his 
back - and that there is no evidence whosoever to suggest either 
that he was having difficulties doing his job or that his work was 
unsatisfactory in any way. What Respondents are attempting to do 
is to have this Court presume his work to have been inadequate by 
suggesting - without support - that he was "permanently and totally 
disabled" when he was injured while he was working1 However, no 
such evidence of inferior work or problems at work exists in this 
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record, and it would further be inappropriate to sanction the 
contradictory presumption urged by the Respondents herein. 
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act should not be construed in 
such a way as to discourage seriously injured workers from 
attempting to return to work, as a matter of public policy. In 
addition, such individuals should not be denied the rights, 
benefits and protection of Worker's Compensation insurance coverage 
which all employees enjoy for the simple reason that they have 
significant prior impairments. Failure to accept this reasoning 
raises serious questions concerning possible violations of the 
federal and state guarantees of equal protection of the law. 
C. Petitioner is entitled to benefits under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
Despite Respondent's inference, it is important to note that 
Mr. Abel is not seeking here to recover twice for the same 
disability; rather he only seeks Utah Worker's Compensation 
benefits for the incremental loss of the minimal wage he was able 
and in fact was earning at the time of his injury. Although 
Respondents have conceded that Mr. Abel is entitled to medical 
benefits and permanent partial benefits, the mere award of partial 
disability compensation does not fully compensate him for his now 
total inability to work, which is the result of the final 5% 
permanent, partial impairment all parties concede that he sustained 
in his industrial injury. 
The March 22, 1989 industrial injury was the "final straw" 
which rendered Mr. Abel incapable of performing any gainful work, 
including, significantly, that which he was performing at the time 
8 
of his industrial accident. Prior to that time and despite his 
other impairments, which had led Social Security to conclude that 
he was totally disabled under it's guidelines, he was nevertheless 
capable of some gainful employment at the time of the industrial 
injury, as demonstrated by the fact that he had been working for 
several weeks and was performing his duties in an acceptable 
manner. 
Respondents' citation of this Court's decision in Large v. 
Industrial Commission, 758 P. 2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) is 
inapplicable to the facts and issues of this case. The lack of 
adequate Findings, as argued above prevents a complete and proper 
determination of medical causation. It is clear, however, that 
despite his prior significant impairments, Mr. Abel was able to 
engage in substantial gainful employment. Now, due* solely to his 
industrial injury, he cannot perform any work. The industrial 
injury is clearly the cause of his present disability and he is 
entitled to compensation for that total disability status. 
D. Petitioner is entitled to benefits under the "odd lot" 
doctrine. 
Respondents have not even addressed Mr. Abel's argument that 
he is also entitled to benefits under a lesser standard of 
entitlement, referred to in the legal literature as the "odd lot 
doctrine. Under that doctrine a worker may be found to be totally 
disabled if by reason of the disability resulting from his 
industrial injury, he cannot perform work of the general character 
that he was performing when injured, or any other work which a 
person of his/her capabilities may be able to do or learn to do. 
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Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
Brundacre v. IML Freight. Inc.. 622 P.2d 790 (Utah 1980). Clark v. 
Interstate Homes, Inc., 604 P.2d 937 (Utah 1979). United Park City 
Mines Co. v. Prescott. 393 P.2d 800 (Utah 1964). Caillet v. 
Industrial Commission, 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936). 
Mr. Abel previously argued that he clearly meet this standard 
for entitlement to benefits, and Respondents have not replied to 
this argument. Their silence on this point should be construed as 
an admission of its relevance and application. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is again respectfully submitted 
that the Industrial Commission erred when it entered its March 27, 
1992 Order denying Mr. Abel's claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits. He was gainfully employed, working 32 hours a week at a 
gainful wage at the time of his injury. The uncontroverted 
evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission supports the 
finding that he sustained a significant permanent impairment due to 
his 1989 industrial accident, and is permanently and totally 
disabled due to that industrial injury as well. Despite his 
Social Security disability status, he was permitted and able to 
work. As a result of his industrial injury he now can no longer 
work. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to award 
him permanent, total disability benefits in accordance with Utah 
Law. 
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DATED this 18th day of March, 1993. 
DA 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988). 
EXHIBIT B: 20 C.F.R. 404.430 (1983). 
EXHIBIT C; Social Security Administration, Ruling No. 84-25 
(1984) . 
Rehabilitation. (Last amended 1991) 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial 
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of 
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission 
shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age 
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate 
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, 
rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 
35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at 
the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection 
(2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer 
or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid 
out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to'the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable 
permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 
35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the 
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to 
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social 
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in 
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings 
have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under 
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The 
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000 
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for 
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee 
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the 
EXHIBIT A 
employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as 
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with 
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or 
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully 
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, 
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such 
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated 
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability 
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 
1988 Second Special Session) 
§ 404.430 Excess earnings defined for tax-
able years ending after December 1972; 
monthly exempt amount defined. 
(a) Method of determining excess 
earnings for years ending after Decem-
ber 1972, For taxable years ending 
after 1972, an individual's excess earn-
ings for a taxable year are 50 percent 
of his or her earnings (as described in 
§ 404.429) for the year which are in 
excess of the product obtained by mul-
tiplying the number of months in that 
taxable year by the following applica-
ble monthly exempt amount: 
(1) $175 for taxable years ending 
after December 1972 and before Janu-
ary 1974; 
(2) $200 for taxable years beginning 
after December 1973 and before Janu-
ary 1975; and 
(3) The exempt amount for taxable 
years ending after December 1974, as 
determined under paragraphs (c) and 
(d) of this section. However, earnings 
in and after the month an individual 
attains age 72 will not be used to 
figure excess earnings for retirement 
test purposes. For the employed indi-
vidual, wages for months prior to the 
month of attainment of age 72 are 
used to figure the excess earnings for 
retirement test purposes. For the self-
employed individual, the pro rata 
share of the net earnings or net loss 
for the taxable year for the period 
prior to the month of attainment of 
age 72 is used to figure the excess 
earnings. If the beneficiary was not 
engaged in self-employment prior to 
the month of attainment of age 72, 
any subsequent earnings or losses 
from self-employment in the taxable 
year will not be used to figure the 
excess earnings. Where the excess 
amount figured under the provisions 
of this section is not a multiple of $1, 
it is reduced to the next lower dollar, 
(All references to age 72 will be age 7o 
for months after December 1982.) 
Example 1. The self-employed beneficiary 
attained age 72 in July 1979. His net earn-
ings for 1979, his taxable year, were $12,000. 
The pro rata share of the net earnings for 
the period prior to July is $6,000. His excess 
earnings for 1979 for retirement test pur. 
poses are $750. This is computed by sub-
tracting $4,500 ($375x12), the exempt 
amount for 1979, from $6,000 and dividing 
the result by 2. 
Example 2. The beneficiary attained age 
72 in July 1979. His taxable year was calen-
dar year 1979. His wages for the period prior 
to July were $6,000. Prom August through 
December 1979, he worked in self-employ, 
ment and had net earnings in the amount of 
$2,000. His net earnings from self-employ, 
ment are not used to figure his excess earn-
ings. Only his wages for the period prior to 
July 1979 ($6,000) are used to figure his 
excess earnings. As in example 1, his excess 
earnings are $750. 
Example 3. The facts are the same as in 
example 2, except that the beneficiary 
worked in self-employment throughout all 
of 1979 and had a net loss of $500 from the 
self-employment activity. The pro rata 
share of the net loss for the period prior to 
July is $250. His earnings for the taxable 
year to be used in figuring excess earnings 
are $5,750. 
This is computed by subtracting the $250 
net loss from self-employment from the 
$6,000 in wages. The excess earnings are 
$625 (($5,750 - $4.500)-2). 
(b) Monthly exempt amount defined. 
The retirement test monthly exempt 
amount is the amount of wages which 
a social security beneficiary may earn 
in any month without part of his or 
her monthly benefit being deducted 
because of excess earnings. For bene-
fits payable for months after 1977, the 
monthly exempt amount applies only 
in a beneficiary's grace year or years. 
(See § 404.435(a) and (c)). 
(c) Method of determining monthly 
exempt amount for taxable years 
ending after December 1974. (1) Except 
as provided under paragraph (d) of 
this section, for purposes of paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section, the applicable 
monthly exempt amount effective for 
an individual's taxable year that ends 
in the calendar year after the calendar 
year in which an automatic cost-of-
living increase in old-age, survivors, 
EXHIBIT B 
and disability insurance benefits is ef-
fective is the larger of— 
(i) The exempt amount in effect for 
months in the taxable year in which 
the exempt amount determination is 
being made; or 
(ii) The amount determined by: 
(a) Multiplying the monthly exempt 
amount effective during the taxable 
year in which the exempt amount de-
termination is being made by the ratio 
of: 
(1) The average amount, per employ-
ee, of the taxable wages of all employ-
ees as reported to the Secretary for 
the first calendar quarter of the calen-
dar year in which the exempt amount 
determination is made, to 
(2) The average amount, per employ-
ee, of the taxable wages of all employ-
ees as reported to the Secretary for 
the first calendar quarter of the most 
recent calendar year in which an in-
crease in the exempt amount was en-
acted or a determination resulting in 
such an increase was made, and 
(b) Rounding the result of such mul-
tiplication: U) To the next higher 
multiple of $10 where such result is a 
multiple of $5 but not of $10, or (2) to 
the nearest multiple of $10 in any 
other case. 
(2) For purposes of paragraph (c)(1) 
of this section, "reported for the first 
calendar quarter" means reported for 
such first calendar quarter and posted 
to the earnings records by the Secre-
tary on or before the last day of the 
Social Security Administration's quar-
terly updating operations in Septem-
ber of the same year. Earnings items 
received or posted thereafter are not 
counted even though they pertain to 
the first quarter. 
(d) Method of determining monthly 
exempt amount for taxable years 
ending after December 1977 for benefi-
ciaries age 65 or over. (1) For purposes 
of paragraph (a)(3) of this section, for 
all months of taxable years ending 
after 1977, the applicable monthly 
exempt amount for an individual who 
has attained age 65 before the close of 
the taxable year involved is— 
(i) $333.33y3 for each month of any 
taxable year ending in 1978; 
(ii) $375 for each month of any tax-
able year ending in 1979; 
(iii) $416.66% for each month of any 
taxable year ending in 1980; and 
(iv) $458.33 y3 for each month of any 
taxable year ending in 1981; and 
(v) $500 for each month of any tax-
able year ending in 1982. 
(2) Fractional amounts listed in 
paragraph (d)(1) of this section shall 
be rounded to the next higher whole 
dollar amount, unless the individual 
shows that doing so results in a differ-
ent grace year (see § 404.435 (a) and 
(O). 
[40 FR 42865, Sept. 17, 1975; 40 FR 45805, 
Oct. 3, 1975, as amended at 45 FR 48117, 
July 18, 1980; 45 FR 58107, Sept. 2, 1980; 48 
FR 4282, Jan. 31,1983] 
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00103.151 Determination of SGA if Substantial Work Activity is Discontinued 
or Reduced 
84-25 
(PPS-113) SSR 84-25 
TITLES II AND XVI: DETERMINATION OF SUBSTANTIAL GAINFUL 
ACTIVITY IF SUBSTANTIAL WORK ACTIVITY IS DISCONTINUED OR 
REDUCED—UNSUCCESSFUL WORK ATTEMPT 
PURPOSE: To state the policy for determining whether substantial work 
activity that is discontinued or reduced below a specified level may be 
considered an unsuccessful work attempt (UWA) under the disability provi-
sions of the law. 
CITATIONS (AUTHORITY): Sections 216(1), 223(d), and 1614(a) of the 
Social Security Act, as amended; Regulations No. 4, Subpart P, sections 
404.1571-404.1576; Regulations No. 16, Subpart I, sections 
416.971-416.976. 
PERTINENT HISTORY: Under the disability provisions of the law, except 
within the trial work period (TWP) provisions, a person who is engaging in 
substantial gainful activity (SGA) is not eligible for payment of disability 
benefits. (There was a temporary provision of the Act, section 1619(a), in 
effect until December 31, 1983, that authorized continued disability pay-
ments to title XVI recipients engaging in SGA, provided their income was 
within specified limits. These payments are being continued for the year 
1984 under a demonstration project (49 Federal Register 9774, March 15, 
1984).) (See Social Security Ruling (SSR) 83-33, Program Policy Statement 
(PPSH07, Determining Whether Work Is Substantial Gainful Act ivi ty-
Employees, regarding evaluation of work activity of employees. See SSR 
83-34, PPS-108, Determining Whether Work Is Substantial Gainful Ac-
tivity—Self-Employed Persons, regarding evaluation of work activity of self-
employed persons.) The UWA concept was designed as an equitable means 
of disregarding relatively brief work attempts that do not demonstrate sus-
tained SGA. 
The concept is embodied in the disability regulations. Concerning em-
ployees, sections 404.1574(a)(1) and 416.974(a)(1) of the regulations state: 
"We will generally consider work that you are forced to stop after a short 
time because of your impairment as an unsuccessful work attempt and your 
earnings from that work will not show that you are able to do substantial 
gainful activity." With respect to the self-employed, sections 404.1575(a) 
and 416.975(a) state: "We will generally consider work that you are forced 
tp stop after a short time because of your impairment as an unsuccessful 
EXHIBIT C 
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work attempt and your income from that work will not show that you are 
able to do substantial gainful activity." 
Specific criteria evolved for evaluating work activity lasting up to 6 
months. Concerning a work effort of over 6 months, operating instructions 
stated that ordinarily we would consider it as successful regardless of why it 
ended or was reduced below the SCA earnings level. Instructions added, 
however, that in "unusual circumstances," a finding of UWA could be 
made, with such cases referred for postadjudicative study. Review of the 
cases referred has not shown that a UWA of over 6 months is warranted. The 
circumstances that existed in these cases (e.g., frequent absences, special 
conditions) and the reasons for work stoppage were not unusual and were 
generally no different from those that existed in cases where the work effort 
lasted no more than 6 months. Also, in some of these referred cases the 
period of work actually lasted longer than the 9 months allowed by law for 
TWP purposes. The provision for permitting the dismissal of work activity of 
over 6 months' duration as a UWA is accordingly being deleted from the 
UWA policy and will no longer be applicable. The UWA criteria currently 
being followed for work of 6 months or less remain unchanged and are 
described in this PPS. 
POLICY STATEMENT: For SCA determination purposes, substantial work 
/nay, under certain conditions, be disregarded if it is discontinued or re-
duced to the non-SGA level after a short time because of the person's 
impairment or the removal of special conditions related to the impairment 
that are essential to the further performance of work. The UWA criteria differ 
depending on whether the work effort was for "3 months or less" or for 
"between 3 and 6 months." If a work attempt was "unsuccessful," a finding 
of disability during the time that such work was performed would not be 
precluded. 
When the UWA is Applicable 
The UWA policy explained in this PPS is to be used in initial disability cases. 
It is also to be used in continuing disability cases in determining whether, 
because of work activity, disability continues or ceases. However,the UWA 
criteria do not apply in determining whether payment should be made for a 
particular month during the reentitlement period after disability has been 
ceased because of SGA. 
Event That Must Precede a UWA 
There must be a significant break in the continuity of a person's work before 
he or she can be considered to have begun a work attempt that later proved 
unsuccessful. Such an interruption would occur when, because of the 
impairment or the removal of special conditions related to the impairment 
that are essential to the further performance of work, the work was discon-
tinued or was reduced (or limited) to the non-SGA level. Work is considered 
to be "discontinued" if the person (1) was out of work for at least 30 
consecutive days or (2) was forced to change to another type of work or 
another employer. (On rare occasions a break lasting a few days less than 30 
may satisfy this requirement if the subsequent work episode was brief and 
clearly not successful because of the impairment.) 
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Event That Must Follow a UWA 
After the first significant break in continuity of a person's work, the ensuing 
period of work is regarded as continuous until another such change oc-
curs—that is, until the impairment or the removal of special conditions 
related to the impairment that are essential to the further performance of 
work causes the work to be "discontinued" as defined above or to be 
reduced to the non-SGA level. Each continuous period, separated by signifi-
cant breaks as described, may be a UWA so long as criteria as to duration 
and conditions of work are met, as set out below. 
UWA Critera—Duration and Conditions of Work 
1. Work Effort of 3 Months or Less 
The work must have ended or have been reduced to the non-SGA 
level within 3 months due to the impairment or to the removal of 
special conditions related to the impairment that are essential to the 
further performance of work. (Examples of "special conditions" are 
given below.) 
2. Work Effort of Between 3 and 6 Months 
If work lasted more than 3 months, it must have ended or have been 
reduced to the non-SGA level within 6 months due to the impair-
ment or to the removal of special conditions (see below) related to 
the impairment that are essential to the further performance of work 
and: 
a. There must have been frequent absences due to the impairment; 
or 
b. The work must have been unsatisfactory due to the impairment; 
or 
c. The work must have been done during a period of temporary 
remission of the impairment; or 
d. The work must have been done under special conditions. 
(To illustrate how UWA time periods are figured, work from 
November 5,. 1982, through a date no later than February 4,1983, is 
for "3 months or less." Work from November 5, 1982, through at 
least February 5, 1983, but through a date no later than May 4, 
1983, is for "between 3 and 6 months") 
3. Work Effort of Over 6 Months 
SGA-level work lasting more than 6 months cannot be a UWA 
regardless of why it ended or was reduced to the non-SGA level. 
4. Performance of Work Under Special Conditions 
One situation under which SGA-level work may have ended, or may 
have been reduced to the non-SGA level, as set out above, is "the 
removal of special conditions related to the impairment that are 
essential to the further performance of work." That is, a severely 
impaired person may have worked under conditions especially 
arranged to accommodate his or her impairment or may have 
worked through an unusual job opportunity, such as in a sheltered 
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workshop. Special or unusual conditions may be evidenced in 
many ways. For example, the person: 
a. Required and received special assistance from other employees 
in performing the job; or 
b. Was allowed to work irregular hours or take frequent rest peri-
ods; or 
c. Was provided with special equipment or was assigned work 
especially suited to the impairment; or 
d. Was able to work only within a framework of especially arranged 
circumstances, such as where other persons helped him or her 
prepare for or get to and from work; or 
e. Was permitted to perform at a lower standard of productivity or 
efficiency than other employees; or 
f. Was granted the opportunity to work, despite his or her hand-
icap, because of family relationship, past association with the 
firm, or other altruistic reason. 
5. Development of Reasons for Work Discontinuance or Reduction 
In considering why a work effort ended or was reduced to the non-
SGA level, we do not rely solely on information from the worker. 
Therefore, if impartial supporting evidence is not already a part of 
the claims file, confirmation with the employer is required. If the 
information from the employer is inconclusive or if none is avail-
able, the reason for work discontinuance or reduction may be 
confirmed with the person's physician or other medical source. 
After being apprised of the circumstances, the physician or other 
medical source could state whether, in his or her opinion or accord-
ing to the records, the work discontinuance or reduction was due to 
the impairment. 
Answers to questions such as the following will help to verify the 
nature and duration of work and the reason it ended or was reduced: 
a. When and why was the SGA-level work interrupted, reduced or 
stopped? 
b. If special working conditions (as described in the preceding 
section) were removed, what were those conditions or con-
cessions? When, how and why were they changed? 
c. Were there frequent absences from work? Were days and hours 
of work irregular and, if so, why? 
d. Was job performance unsatisfactory because of the impairment? 
e. Did the employer reduce the person's duties, responsibilities or 
earnings because of the impairment? 
f. When the employee's work effort ended, was the continuity of 
employment broken? Did the employer grant sick leave or hold 
the position open for the person's return? 
g. In the case of a self-employed person, what has happened to the 
business since the discontinuance or reduction of work? If the 
business continued in operation, who managed and worked in it 
and what income will the disabled person derive from it? 
EFFECTIVE DATE: The policy explained herein is effective as of the date of 
publication of this PPS. 
CROSS-REFERENCES: Program Operations Manual System, Part 4 sec-
tions Dl 00503.50O-00503.515; SSR 82-67, PPS-77, Extension crfElfgi-
bihty for Benefits Based on Disability; SSR 83-33, PPS-107, Determining 
Whether Work Is Substantial Gainful Activity—Employees; SSR 83-14 
PPS-108, Determining Whether Work Is Substantial Gainful Activity—Self-
Employed Persons. 
